As the United States and its regional allies are beefing-up missile defenses in the Gulf, Iran announces the development of a light plane called “Faez” (Fars News, February 8 2010) and the inauguration of two production lines for two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). According to Fars News (February 8, 2010),

[t]he two hi-tech drones named ‘Ra’d’ (Thunder) and ‘Nazir’ (Harbinger) are capable of conducting long-range reconnaissance, patrolling, assault and bombing missions with high precision.

Ra’d which is a UAV of choice for assault and bombing missions has the capability to destroy the specified targets with high pinpoint precision.

Experts believe that once the UAV enters the scene of aerial missions, it would enhance the reconnaissance, patrolling and defensive power of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Force.

Yes, I am suggesting a connection here. As I understand it, small planes and stealthy drones could be used to overcome missile defense systems (either in concert with or prior to an attack with ballistic missiles).

Iran also sends a message to Russia: Heshmatollah Kasiri, a high-ranking commander of the Iranian Air Force, was quoted as saying that Iran will develop an air defense system which will be superior to Russia’s S-300.

“Today, we are building all our air defence weapons by ourselves … the only thing we wanted to import was the Russian S-300 which so far they have not delivered for some unacceptable reasons [...] But our air defence experts and scientists found a way and in very near future we will produce an air defence system which has the capabilities of the Russian S-300 or even more.” (Middle East Online, February 8, 2010)

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Returning from a short holiday I found my mailbox and feed-reader stuffed with news … a lot of new input for the upcoming missile defense conference:

• Iran tested a new missile called “Kavoshgar-3″ – click here for an analysis by the one and only ACTWonk.
• Romania’s president announced that his country will – after approval by the Romanian parliament – host components of the US missile defense system.
• The DoD has published its BMD Review (click here to download). I’ll have a look at it and post on it in the next days.
• Russia has a new military doctrine and Nikolai Sokov has an analysis of it. As Pavel Podvig notes, the new doctrine includes important changes in the realm of nuclear weapons.

A lot of stuff to read for the next week I wish you a nice week-end!

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The New York Times reports on US plans to deploy Patriot batteries in four Middle Eastern states (maybe Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait – click here to download a graphical overview of the deployments provided by The Guardian) and two AEGIS cruisers in the Persian Gulf.

In this context, Travis Sharp’s two posts on the vulnerability of AEGIS destroyers and David Gormley’s recent ACT article on the proliferation of cruise missiles (see also his book “Missile Contagion“) are very insightful. For a discussion of missile defense in the Middle East see my recent article in Middle East Policy… Anyway, the main deterrent will not be Patriot but US personnel operating the batteries.

On the week-end I also came across a report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) comparing different missile defense options for the protection of Europe and the United States. Remember my earlier posts (here and here) on missile defense deployments in Turkey? The report weighs four options, the third option being

Land-based SM-3 Block IIA interceptors operating from mobile launchers at two existing U.S. bases: Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany and Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey. Tracking would be provided by forward-based transportable X-band radars in Azerbaijan and Qatar. This system would be available around 2015. (p. xiii)

As far as the ability to defend Europe and the US is concerned, the report notes the following:

The other alternatives in this analysis (Options 2, 3, and 4) would provide broad defense of most of Europe against all modeled missile threats. All of those options include interceptor locations nearer to Iran than the proposed European Interceptor Site in Poland and thus would provide more extensive defense of southeastern Europe. (emphasis added; p. xvii)

The options with sea-based and land-based SM-3 Block IIA interceptors (Options 2 and 3) would provide some additional defense of the United States against liquid-fuel ICBMs but none against solid-fuel ICBMs. Those options could provide about the same level of U.S. defense as MDA’s proposed European system if they added launch sites for SM-3 Block IIA interceptors in the United States. (p. xviii)

Here is the report’s graphical summary (p. xix) for the defense of Europe (click here to enlarge):

P.S. The four horsemen ride on video:

You can order the film at th The Nuclear Tipping Point web-page.

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since my last post here.

The reason for my lack of activity is … yes, the missile defense conference. To give you a brief up-date: we have expanded the program to include an additional panel on missile defense and missile non-proliferation.

You can download the detailed program here. To register for the conference (no fees) click here.

Apart from the conference, there are some other things I want to share with you:

Three papers …

• ISIS on Burma.
• Rolf Mowatt-Larssen of Harvard’s Belfer Center on AlQaeda and WMD.
• Matthew Kroenig of Harvard’s Belfer Center on “The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation.”

and the thrill of waiting for the announced unveiling of new missiles and weapons by Iran:

A top commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said on Tuesday that the country’s armed forces will unveil several missiles and weapons at the 31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution next month.Mehr news agency quoted commander Massud Jazayeri as saying: “Several missile and weapons projects will be unveiled during the 10 days of dawn (February 1 to 11) by armed forces.” (AFP via Asian Defence, Janauary 26, 2010)

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I’m sorry for my long absence from the blog – a lot of good and bad things have kept me busy. Anyway, I promise a higher posting frequency in the new year (I know that this is actually the most frequent promise on many, if not most blogs …).

Sean O’ Connor has an interesting up-date on the Irans’s Tabriz missile site (his previous posts on Iran’s Tabriz and Khorramabad sites are here and here). Do not miss Sean’s article on Iranian Strategic SAM Deployment, which ends with the following conclusion:

On the surface, Iran’s ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the seven S-200 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals an overall coverage which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian strategic SAM force is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran’s SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form of defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense capability.

Another up-date on Turkey and missile defense: “Turkey objects to plans of deploying U.S. missile defense elements on its soil because it could worsen relations with Russia and Iran, national media reported Wednesday.” (Ria Novosti, December 16, 2009).

The program of our conference “Ballistic Missile Defense: Global and Regional Dynamics” (at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna on February 18 and 19, 2010) is now complete and registration is possible.

Panel I – Ballistic Missile Defense and the Great Powers

Recent Trends and Prospects of U.S. Missile Defense Policy
Bernd Kubbig, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Europe
Anthony Seaboyer, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The Russian Federation
Gerhard Mangott, University of Innsbruck

The People’s Republic of China
Xia Liping, Tongji University

Chair: Jürgen Wilzewski, University of Technology Kaiserslautern

Panel II – Ballistic Missile Defense in East Asia and the Pacific

Motivations of Regional and External Actors
Camilla T. N. Sørensen, University of Copenhagen

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability:
A Positive View
Robert Schmucker, Technical University Munich

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability: 
A Negative View
Xia Liping, Tongji University

Chair: Martin Senn, University of Innsbruck

Panel III – Ballistic Missile Defense in the Middle East

Motivations of Regional and External Actors
Anoush Ehteshami, Durham University

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability: 
A Positive View
Uzi Rubin, Rubicon Defense Consulting

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability: 
A Negative View
Reuven Pedatzur, Tel Aviv University

Chair: Gudrun Harrer, Der Standard

Round-off Speech: Ballistic Missile Defense and Global Zero

Martin Senn, University of Innsbruck

Chair: Gerhard Mangott, University of Innsbruck

Click here for a detailed program and to register for the conference. I’m looking forward to meeting you in Vienna!

If your still looking for a Christmas holiday reading, I recommend the following.

I wish you a merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!!

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Last Friday, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2009/82 (earlier IAEA resolutions, reports and SC resolutions on Iran are availbale on the IAEA website) and thus passed the case to the Security Council. The ArmsControlWonk features interesting information on the wording of the latest resolution. In a comment Mark Fitzpatrick argues that, unlike resolution GOV/2005/77, resolutions GOV/2009/82 and GOV/2006/14 do not explicitly mention Iranian non-compliance. As fas as GOV/2009/82 is concerned, Fitzpatrick notes that:

the Board should have made a similar explicit finding of noncompliance, using that term. I expect that the drafters omitted it in order to get a larger number of yes votes, and to try to preserve some (very) small prospect of a deal on the TRR fuel.

Iran has reacted with usual defiance:

President Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would construct as many as 10 new enrichment plants and explore indigenous ways of enriching urnium for its medical reactor. Moreover, Iranian parliamentarians have demanded further restrictions to Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA and the withdrawal from the NPT:

“We have options ranging from complete and full cooperation to leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty on our table,” said Kazem Jalali, spokesman for the parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee. “But we believe that if the West reforms its path, we can still choose the full-cooperation option.”

However, withdrawing from the NPT seems to be an unlikely option as the costs of such a move (making sanctions and even a military strike more likely; further international isolation; delegitimizing its claim to nuclear energy) would outweigh any benefits (if there are any at the present stage). The drastic expansion of its enrichment capabilities also appears to be beyond Iran’s technological capabilities.

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According to Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran will reject the uranium-enrichment proposal and will instead propose a LEU-HEU exchange on its soil. The deal would have been an opportunity to build trust and, even more importantly, it would have amounted to an acceptance of Iran’s right to uranium enrichment. So Iran could have gained a lot, but domestic struggles and visceral skepticism have prevented Tehran from accepting deal.

As President Obama indicates readiness to impose new sanctions, the question remains whether tougher sanctions could eventually backfire. As David G. Herbert reported for NTI’s GSN (November 3, 2009):

For starters, it’s unclear whether the legislation will be enough to dissuade Iran’s main suppliers — Royal Dutch Shell, France’s Total, China’s state-run Zhuhai Zhenrong Corp. and Russia’s Lukoil, among others — from continuing to import gasoline. Tehran has said it will cut off any company that complies with U.S. sanctions, a threat that will keep some companies in line.

And even if some gasoline exports to Iran can be curtailed, Russia and Venezuela have the excess refining capacity to plug the gap, according to Fariborz Ghadar, a trade expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Hugo Chavez is already bringing Venezuela’s considerable refining capabilities to bear: In September, Caracas pledged to supply Iran with 20,000 barrels of gasoline a day.

And what will happen if the sanctions are successful and oil majors stop selling Iran gasoline? The result might be the worst scenario of all, Ghadar argued. Iranians currently get 100 liters of discounted petrol every month, but at great expense to the government. The ruling government has been looking for ways to shrink the subsidy program, and the U.S. sanctions would give them cover to do so. That would hurt everyday Iranians, cast Washington (once again) as a villain and perhaps rally citizens around Ahmadinejad, who is still politically weak after post-election rioting this summer.

As for North Korea, President Obama confirmed that Stephen Bosworth will travel to Pyongyang to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Moreover, he called for a “grand bargain” with North Korea that would eventually resolve the nuclear crisis. So there are interesting times ahead.

Although Obama’s trip to China has been largely covered in negative terms, he did succeed in taking positive steps in the nuclear realm:

In the [joint] statement, the United States and China “reaffirmed their commitment made on 27 June 1998 not to target at each other the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control.” This reverses a decision by the Bush administration, which was first announced in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, to target China with U.S. nuclear weapons.

Gregory Kulacki, a senior analyst and China project manager at the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), said the reaffirmation of the earlier de-targeting agreement, reached during President Clinton’s visit to China in 1998, is “a positive step toward reducing nuclear tensions between the two countries.”

In the joint statement, both countries committed to work together to achieve two important items on President Obama’s agenda that would reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed to “pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as soon as possible” as well as “support the launching of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at an early date in the Conference on Disarmament.” Neither country has ratified the CTBT, and some U.S. senators oppose U.S. ratification until China does.

Make sure you don’t miss the latest article of the Nuclear Notebook on “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009.”

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The Guardian reports that Iran tested a so-called two-point implosion device. James Acton is quoted as saying: “It’s remarkable that, before perfecting step one, they are going straight to step four or five … To start with more sophisticated designs speaks of level of technical ambition that is surprising.”

I guess that this revelation is no coincidence…

By the way, the recent U.S.-EU Joint Declaration contains an interesting paragraph:

We are committed to preserve and strengthen the authority and integrity of the NPT. The NPT, based on its three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, represents a unique and irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace, security, and stability. We will work actively for the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference. We welcome the proposals on all three pillars of the NPT presented by the EU, which can inform our efforts to develop a forward looking action plan at the Review Conference. We call upon all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to achieve universality. We will also work with regional states to advance the objectives of the 1995 Middle East Resolution. (emphasis added)

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Worried about the safty of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? There may be more reasons to worry as Iraq intends to reconstruct at least (!) one nuclear reactor (GSN, October 28, 2009):

“We are cooperating with the [International Atomic Energy Agency] and expanding and defining areas of research where we can implement nuclear technology for peaceful means,” Iraqi Science and Technology Minister Raid Fahmi said. “After the dissolution [of the Hussein regime] we did not have an industry, but we have become more and more conscious of the need for nuclear technology. This was raised several months ago with the relevant bodies.”

Iraq is considering “only peaceful applications” for a potential nuclear program, “including the health sector, agriculture … and water treatment,” Fahmi said. The effort would focus solely on research as it gained its footing, but it would eventually aim to supply water and electricity to Iraq’s residents.

Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments has published a report on “US Nuclear Forces: Meeting the Challenges of a Proliferated World” (click here to download). Looks like interesting stuff …

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Pavel Felgenhauer argues in the Eurasia Daily Monitor (October 22, 2009) that the possible nuclear deal with Iran could open a window of opportunity for Russia to finally ship S-300 defense systems to Iran:

However, this apparent breakthrough may come at a grave price if in exchange for its “flexibility” Iran finally gets the S-300’s from Moscow. Washington is currently praising Tehran for finally responding to Barack Obama’s outstretched hand and will not be in a strong position to do or say much if Moscow rewards Tehran with S-300’s.

Well, what about the arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia? Selling S-300 to Iran would decrease Russian leverage and would definitely not be appreciated by Congress, which would eventually backfire in the ratification process of a treaty suceeding START I.

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