It’s Nuclear Hysteria, isn’t it?

Nuclear (Dis)armament, Nuclear Terrorism, missile defense No Comments

After hosting last week’s BMD conference in Vienna (Our new media department is working on the videos and mp3s of the panel-speeches. Curious? ) and getting my course-plans ready for the next term, I finally have a few minutes to write a couple of lines.

On my way back from Vienna, I skimmed through the latest issue of Foreign Policy and, of course, John Mueller’s article on nuclear weapons caught my attention. I had bought Mueller’s book “Atomic Obsession” a couple of weeks ago (unfortunatley, it is still collecting dust in the shelf but I promise to read it … soon ;-) ) and so I curiously studied his arguments in FP. There are three points I would like to raise (Ken Adelman already responded to Mueller’s piece – you can read his article here):

1) Mueller argues that treaty-based agreements are not needed for the reductions/elimination of nuclear weapons:

But all of this is scarcely needed. Nuclear weapons are already disappearing, and elaborate international plans like the one Obama is pushing aren’t needed to make it happen. During the Cold War, painstakingly negotiated treaties did little to advance the cause of disarmament — and some efforts, such as the 1972 SALT Agreement, made the situation worse from a military standpoint. With the easing of tensions after the Cold War, a sort of negative arms race has taken place, and the weapons have been going away more or less by themselves as policymakers wake up to the fact that having fewer useless things is cheaper than having more of them. By 2002, the number of deployed warheads in Russian and U.S. arsenals had dropped from 70,000 to around 30,000, and it now stands at less than 10,000. “Real arms control,” wistfully reflected former U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control Avis Bohlen in an essay last May, “became possible only when it was no longer necessary.” (emphasis added)

Well, is it really that easy? While it is true that we have seen the reduction of the over-kill capacity, the tough phases of reduction are still lying before us. Given the fear of cheating and break-out, which would be more serious in a world with fewer nucler weapons, reductions below a certain level cannot and will not be achieved without treaties. Moreover, Mueller’s view that nukes are “useless things” is – unfortuntely – still not shared by many decision-makers around the world and nukes are still seen as the ultimate means to ensure national security. It is one thing to judge the utility of nuclear weapons as a professor and conclude that they are useless, but is quite another thing to do so a decision-maker.

2) In a later section of the article, Mueller cites French and British reductions and notes that “the Chinese have built far fewer of the nuclear weapons than they could have – they currently stock just 180.” Is this really good news? You could also put it like this: China keeps modernizing its nuclear arsenal (to ensure its reliability and survivability) and is estimated the deploy between 50 and 100 ICBMS by 2015 (see the report by P. Podvig and H. Zhang on “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space”, p. 51-52). The numbers could even be higher (around 200 warheads on ICBMs, according to H. Zhang), if Beijing decides to speed up modernization/extension as a reaction to US missile defenses. Not quite a negative arms race, right?

3) Mueller also addresses the impact of a nuclear explosion on the American society and economy:

Although former CIA chief George Tenet insists in his memoirs that one “mushroom cloud” would “destroy our economy,” he never bothers to explain how the instant and tragic destruction of three square miles somewhere in the United States would lead inexorably to national economic annihilation. A nuclear explosion in, say, New York City — as Obama so darkly invoked — would obviously be a tremendous calamity that would roil markets and cause great economic hardship, but would it extinguish the rest of the country? Would farmers cease plowing? Would manufacturers close their assembly lines? Would all businesses, governmental structures, and community groups evaporate?

Americans are highly unlikely to react to an atomic explosion, however disastrous, by immolating themselves and their economy. In 1945, Japan weathered not only two nuclear attacks but intense nationwide conventional bombing; the horrific experience did not destroy Japan as a society or even as an economy. Nor has persistent, albeit nonnuclear, terrorism in Israel caused that state to disappear — or to abandon democracy.

Even the notion that an act of nuclear terrorism would cause the American people to lose confidence in the government is belied by the traumatic experience of Sept. 11, 2001, when expressed confidence in America’s leaders paradoxically soared. And it contradicts decades of disaster research that documents how socially responsible behavior increases under such conditions — seen yet again in the response of those evacuating the World Trade Center on 9/11.

But what about the scenario of a nuclear explosion in one US city (e.g. New York) followed by the threat (!) of a terrorist organization to detonate nuclear explosives in two or three other cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, or Washington – or, even worse, two or three unspecified cities? I doubt that reactions of US citizens during and after the attacks of 9/11 are a good indicator for what would happen in situation like this. The discussion about whether terrorists could succeed in obtaining/constructing a nuclear weapons is of course a different story.

A last note: You may have heard that Libya’s Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi called for a Jihad against Switzerland …

The (second) Obama disarmament paradox

Nuclear (Dis)armament, missile defense No Comments

Greg Mello has an op-ed on the web-page of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in which he argues that the increase of funding for nuclear weapons in the federal budget request contradicts President Obama’s stated goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Now here is my take on a second Obama disarmament paradox:

Reading through the DoD’s BMD Review Report the other day, two things caught my eye:

First: In the section on co-operation with the Russian Federation, the report states that “the Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defense.” (p. 34) This sounds like there will be rough times ahead for further offensive reductions as Russian political and military elites have repeatedly linked further reductions to an agreement on missile defense (if you have the common “Russia has to disarm anyway”-argument in mind, you should drop by Pavel Podvig’s blog and let yourself convince of the contrary)

Second, and even more interesting: The report also notes that the US needs to put an emphasis on the development and deployment of

missile defenses that are both relocatable and scalable. Relocatable assets can be surged to a region in times of crisis, providing increased capability against a larger threat raid size. This feature will also allow missile defenses to be brought to bear in regions relatively swiftly. Scalable assets can be integrated into existing regional architectures. (p. 27)

In addition, the DoD intends “to develop an ‘engage on remote’ technology that includes not only launching on data from a remote sensor track but also the ability to uplink data from assets other than the Aegis radar. This will allow the interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater ranges.” (p. 22) An illustration on the same page shows a forward-based X-band radar and a space-based sensor providing information to an Aegis ship.

Alright, now here is a brief passage of Dean Wilkening’s 2000 Adelphi Paper “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability”:

Only when upper-tier interceptors are guided in flight beyond the range of their tracking and fire control radars can THAAD or NTW [Navy Theater Wide] provide substantial coverage of the US. For example, if accurate track data is obtained early in the trajectory of an intercontinental missile by sensors such as upgraded early-warning radars located outside the US or SBIRS-Low, and this track data is communicated to interceptors in flight, then the hypothetical THAAD footprint against ICBMs increases to a circle about 1,100km in diameter. This implies that 10-12 sites could cover the continental United States. Between three and four NTW footprints would be required under these circumstances. Currently, neither THAAD nor NTW is being designed to accept track data in flight except from their ground- or sea-based radars. However, if SBIRS-Low is deployed, Russian planners fearing the worst might believe that upper-tier TMD interceptors could be guided in flight using its track data, especially if the in-flight interceptor communications system is deployed as part of a future US NMD system. [emphasis added]

On balance, it is hard to imagine that Russia or China would be willing to considerably reduce their offensive arsenals, if the US retains the ability to boost the homeland defense by relocating and/or connecting TMD systems with remote sensors.

Oh yes, I’m really looking forward to discussing these issues at next week’s conference. Anyway, I would also appreciate earlier – online – comments on missile defense break-out and global zero :-)

Iranian Light Plane and Drones – Action, reaction … ?

Iran, missile defense No Comments

As the United States and its regional allies are beefing-up missile defenses in the Gulf, Iran announces the development of a light plane called “Faez” (Fars News, February 8 2010) and the inauguration of two production lines for two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). According to Fars News (February 8, 2010),

[t]he two hi-tech drones named ‘Ra’d’ (Thunder) and ‘Nazir’ (Harbinger) are capable of conducting long-range reconnaissance, patrolling, assault and bombing missions with high precision.

Ra’d which is a UAV of choice for assault and bombing missions has the capability to destroy the specified targets with high pinpoint precision.

Experts believe that once the UAV enters the scene of aerial missions, it would enhance the reconnaissance, patrolling and defensive power of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Force.

Yes, I am suggesting a connection here. As I understand it, small planes and stealthy drones could be used to overcome missile defense systems (either in concert with or prior to an attack with ballistic missiles).

Iran also sends a message to Russia: Heshmatollah Kasiri, a high-ranking commander of the Iranian Air Force, was quoted as saying that Iran will develop an air defense system which will be superior to Russia’s S-300.

“Today, we are building all our air defence weapons by ourselves … the only thing we wanted to import was the Russian S-300 which so far they have not delivered for some unacceptable reasons [...] But our air defence experts and scientists found a way and in very near future we will produce an air defence system which has the capabilities of the Russian S-300 or even more.” (Middle East Online, February 8, 2010)

A lot of news

Iran, Nuclear (Dis)armament, ballistic missile, missile defense No Comments

Returning from a short holiday I found my mailbox and feed-reader stuffed with news … a lot of new input for the upcoming missile defense conference:

  • Iran tested a new missile called “Kavoshgar-3″ – click here for an analysis by the one and only ACTWonk.
  • Romania’s president announced that his country will – after approval by the Romanian parliament – host components of the US missile defense system.
  • The DoD has published its BMD Review (click here to download). I’ll have a look at it and post on it in the next days.
  • Russia has a new military doctrine and Nikolai Sokov has an analysis of it. As Pavel Podvig notes, the new doctrine includes important changes in the realm of nuclear weapons.

A lot of stuff to read for the next week :-) I wish you a nice week-end!

Missile Defense Co-operation

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Missile defense afficinados know that the recent test of GMD failed. In addition to a video of the launch I want to share Riki Ellison’s (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance) impressions and thoughts on the test, failure, and – of course – the need to do more in the realm of missile defense:

Dear Members and Friends,

On a perfect sunny winter afternoon in California standing on the flat rocks of the Ronald Reagan Memorial overlooking the missile silos on the Pacific shoreline at Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) engines light up with brilliance and the rocket disappears for a few seconds in the clouds of exhaust. The rocket reappears, accelerating and ripping through the clear sky with a single white vapor trail arching overhead as the low thunder sound doesn’t catch up to what you are watching.

[…]

The Ground-Based Interceptors in Vandenberg, California and Fort Greely, Alaska are our only defense against the long-range ballistic missile threat fast coming upon us. As President Obama said to our nation last week, “the greatest danger to the American people… is the threat of nuclear weapons.”

We need more than ever “True Grit” and determination for Missile Defense.

Respectfully,
Riki Ellison

In a speech in Paris, Secretary Clinton emphasized Washington’s readiness to co-operate with Russia on BMD (after similar statements by Lavrov):

We are working with our allies to ensure that NATO has the plans it needs for responding to new and evolving contingencies. We are engaged in productive discussions with our European allies about building a new missile defense architecture that will defend all of NATO territory against ballistic missile attack. And we are serious about exploring ways to cooperate with Russia to develop missile defenses that enhance the security of all of Europe, including Russia.

Missile defense, we believe, will make this continent a safer place. That safety could extend to Russia, if Russia decides to cooperate with us. It is an extraordinary opportunity for us to work together to build our mutual security.

Missile Defense in the Middle East

Iran, Nuclear (Non)proliferation, missile defense, publications No Comments

The New York Times reports on US plans to deploy Patriot batteries in four Middle Eastern states (maybe Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait – click here to download a graphical overview of the deployments provided by The Guardian) and two AEGIS cruisers in the Persian Gulf.

In this context, Travis Sharp’s two posts on the vulnerability of AEGIS destroyers and David Gormley’s recent ACT article on the proliferation of cruise missiles (see also his book “Missile Contagion“) are very insightful. For a discussion of missile defense in the Middle East see my recent article in Middle East Policy… Anyway, the main deterrent will not be Patriot but US personnel operating the batteries.

On the week-end I also came across a report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) comparing different missile defense options for the protection of Europe and the United States. Remember my earlier posts (here and here) on missile defense deployments in Turkey? The report weighs four options, the third option being

Land-based SM-3 Block IIA interceptors operating from mobile launchers at two existing U.S. bases: Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany and Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey. Tracking would be provided by forward-based transportable X-band radars in Azerbaijan and Qatar. This system would be available around 2015. (p. xiii)

As far as the ability to defend Europe and the US is concerned, the report notes the following:

The other alternatives in this analysis (Options 2, 3, and 4) would provide broad defense of most of Europe against all modeled missile threats. All of those options include interceptor locations nearer to Iran than the proposed European Interceptor Site in Poland and thus would provide more extensive defense of southeastern Europe. (emphasis added; p. xvii)

The options with sea-based and land-based SM-3 Block IIA interceptors (Options 2 and 3) would provide some additional defense of the United States against liquid-fuel ICBMs but none against solid-fuel ICBMs. Those options could provide about the same level of U.S. defense as MDA’s proposed European system if they added launch sites for SM-3 Block IIA interceptors in the United States. (p. xviii)

Here is the report’s graphical summary (p. xix) for the defense of Europe (click here to enlarge):

P.S. The four horsemen ride on video:

You can order the film at th The Nuclear Tipping Point web-page.

It has been a long time …

Iran, Nuclear (Non)proliferation, Nuclear Terrorism, missile defense No Comments

since my last post here.

The reason for my lack of activity is … yes, the missile defense conference. To give you a brief up-date: we have expanded the program to include an additional panel on missile defense and missile non-proliferation.

You can download the detailed program here. To register for the conference (no fees) click here.

Apart from the conference, there are some other things I want to share with you:

Three papers …

and the thrill of waiting for the announced unveiling of new missiles and weapons by Iran:

A top commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said on Tuesday that the country’s armed forces will unveil several missiles and weapons at the 31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution next month.Mehr news agency quoted commander Massud Jazayeri as saying: “Several missile and weapons projects will be unveiled during the 10 days of dawn (February 1 to 11) by armed forces.” (AFP via Asian Defence, Janauary 26, 2010)

China’s Cruise Missiles

ballistic missile, cruise missile, missile defense No Comments

Check out the Martin Andrew’s China Brief (Vol. 10, Issue 1) on “China’s Conventional Cruise and Ballistic Missile Force Modernization and Deployment”.

The Russians clearly regard the threat from China’s ballistic and cruise missiles as serious, deploying S-400 missile and radar systems along its eastern borders ostensively to protect Russia from wayward North Korean missiles (RIA Novosti, August 26, 2009). Interestingly, no North Korean missiles are recorded as having accidentally landed in Russia.  North Korean missiles are launched eastwards toward the Yellow Sea away from Russia and China. The S-400 deployment did however coincide nicely with China’s October 1 parade.

[...]

A 2008 U.S. government estimate reported that all of China’s 300 km range DF-11 and 600 km range DF-15 SRBMs facing Taiwan amounted to a combined total of between 970 and 1,070 missiles along with 200 GLCMs (Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008). The amount of these launchers facing Taiwan is around 210 to 250, assuming each DF-15 TEL is capable of firing three missiles, and each DF-11 can fire five missiles before needing to be refurbished. For every DF-15 TEL deployed there needs to be one missile-reloading vehicle and two for each DF-11, as each reloading vehicle is assumed to carry two missiles. Add a command and communications vehicle or two and this means a lot of road movement by large vehicles that could easily attract attention.

Well, it seems that there is an increasing potential for a trilateral (US-RF-PRC) arms dynamic …

UPDATE: The New York Times reports (January 11, 2010) that, according to Chinese media, China tested “ground-based midcourse missile interception technology” on Monday. The NYT report also quotes Hans Kristensen of the FAS as arguing that ”[t]here is an obvious concern in Beijing that they need an effective anti-ballistic missile defense in some form.”

Missile Defense Update

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Let me first wish you a happy, healthy and successful New Year! It will certainly be an eventful year for the arms control community and a decisive year for the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

On January 14, the editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists will move the doomsday clock. Click here to watch a live stream of the event.

Now back to missile defense:

NTI reports (January 7, 2010) that Taiwan will eventually receive PAC-3:

Lockheed Martin Corp. has been cleared to sell Patriot Advanced Capability 3 systems to Taipei, said Washington’s unofficial embassy in Taiwan. The new armaments, defense experts say, could give Taiwan the ability to eliiminate short- and medium-range missiles launched from China.

The Patriots appear to be the final component of a $6.5 billion weapons deal approved in the final months of the Bush administration. “This is the last piece that Taiwan has been waiting on,” said Wendell Minnick, Asia bureau chief for Defense News.

I doubt that this arms sale will contribute to stability in the region. Moreover, it is not unlikely that it will fuel China’s suspicions regarding Washington’s missile defense plans.

In the Middle East, Israel is advancing its multi-tier missile defense system as Iron Dome (click here to watch a video on Iron Dome by its manufatcurer Rafael) has successfully completed final tests and “is planned to be integrated into the Israeli Army within six months, officials said.” (Defense News, January 7, 2010)

Iran, Missile (Defense), and Merry Christmas!

Iran, missile defense 1 Comment

I’m sorry for my long absence from the blog – a lot of good and bad things have kept me busy. Anyway, I promise a higher posting frequency in the new year (I know that this is actually the most frequent promise on many, if not most blogs …).

Sean O’ Connor has an interesting up-date on the Irans’s Tabriz missile site (his previous posts on Iran’s Tabriz and Khorramabad sites are here and here). Do not miss Sean’s article on Iranian Strategic SAM Deployment, which ends with the following conclusion:

On the surface, Iran’s ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the seven S-200 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals an overall coverage which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian strategic SAM force is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran’s SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form of defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense capability.

Another up-date on Turkey and missile defense: “Turkey objects to plans of deploying U.S. missile defense elements on its soil because it could worsen relations with Russia and Iran, national media reported Wednesday.” (Ria Novosti, December 16, 2009).

The program of our conference “Ballistic Missile Defense: Global and Regional Dynamics” (at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna on February 18 and 19, 2010) is now complete and registration is possible.

Panel I – Ballistic Missile Defense and the Great Powers

Recent Trends and Prospects of U.S. Missile Defense Policy
Bernd Kubbig, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Europe
Anthony Seaboyer, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The Russian Federation
Gerhard Mangott, University of Innsbruck

The People’s Republic of China
Xia Liping, Tongji University

Chair: Jürgen Wilzewski, University of Technology Kaiserslautern

Panel II – Ballistic Missile Defense in East Asia and the Pacific

Motivations of Regional and External Actors
Camilla T. N. Sørensen, University of Copenhagen

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability:
A Positive View
Robert Schmucker, Technical University Munich

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability: 
A Negative View
Xia Liping, Tongji University

Chair: Martin Senn, University of Innsbruck

Panel III – Ballistic Missile Defense in the Middle East

Motivations of Regional and External Actors
Anoush Ehteshami, Durham University

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability: 
A Positive View
Uzi Rubin, Rubicon Defense Consulting

The Impact of Missile Defenses on Regional Stability: 
A Negative View
Reuven Pedatzur, Tel Aviv University

Chair: Gudrun Harrer, Der Standard

Round-off Speech: Ballistic Missile Defense and Global Zero

Martin Senn, University of Innsbruck

Chair: Gerhard Mangott, University of Innsbruck

Click here for a detailed program and to register for the conference. I’m looking forward to meeting you in Vienna!

If your still looking for a Christmas holiday reading, I recommend the following. ;-)

I wish you a merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!!

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