It’s Nuclear Hysteria, isn’t it?

Nuclear (Dis)armament, Nuclear Terrorism, missile defense No Comments

After hosting last week’s BMD conference in Vienna (Our new media department is working on the videos and mp3s of the panel-speeches. Curious? ) and getting my course-plans ready for the next term, I finally have a few minutes to write a couple of lines.

On my way back from Vienna, I skimmed through the latest issue of Foreign Policy and, of course, John Mueller’s article on nuclear weapons caught my attention. I had bought Mueller’s book “Atomic Obsession” a couple of weeks ago (unfortunatley, it is still collecting dust in the shelf but I promise to read it … soon ;-) ) and so I curiously studied his arguments in FP. There are three points I would like to raise (Ken Adelman already responded to Mueller’s piece – you can read his article here):

1) Mueller argues that treaty-based agreements are not needed for the reductions/elimination of nuclear weapons:

But all of this is scarcely needed. Nuclear weapons are already disappearing, and elaborate international plans like the one Obama is pushing aren’t needed to make it happen. During the Cold War, painstakingly negotiated treaties did little to advance the cause of disarmament — and some efforts, such as the 1972 SALT Agreement, made the situation worse from a military standpoint. With the easing of tensions after the Cold War, a sort of negative arms race has taken place, and the weapons have been going away more or less by themselves as policymakers wake up to the fact that having fewer useless things is cheaper than having more of them. By 2002, the number of deployed warheads in Russian and U.S. arsenals had dropped from 70,000 to around 30,000, and it now stands at less than 10,000. “Real arms control,” wistfully reflected former U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control Avis Bohlen in an essay last May, “became possible only when it was no longer necessary.” (emphasis added)

Well, is it really that easy? While it is true that we have seen the reduction of the over-kill capacity, the tough phases of reduction are still lying before us. Given the fear of cheating and break-out, which would be more serious in a world with fewer nucler weapons, reductions below a certain level cannot and will not be achieved without treaties. Moreover, Mueller’s view that nukes are “useless things” is – unfortuntely – still not shared by many decision-makers around the world and nukes are still seen as the ultimate means to ensure national security. It is one thing to judge the utility of nuclear weapons as a professor and conclude that they are useless, but is quite another thing to do so a decision-maker.

2) In a later section of the article, Mueller cites French and British reductions and notes that “the Chinese have built far fewer of the nuclear weapons than they could have – they currently stock just 180.” Is this really good news? You could also put it like this: China keeps modernizing its nuclear arsenal (to ensure its reliability and survivability) and is estimated the deploy between 50 and 100 ICBMS by 2015 (see the report by P. Podvig and H. Zhang on “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space”, p. 51-52). The numbers could even be higher (around 200 warheads on ICBMs, according to H. Zhang), if Beijing decides to speed up modernization/extension as a reaction to US missile defenses. Not quite a negative arms race, right?

3) Mueller also addresses the impact of a nuclear explosion on the American society and economy:

Although former CIA chief George Tenet insists in his memoirs that one “mushroom cloud” would “destroy our economy,” he never bothers to explain how the instant and tragic destruction of three square miles somewhere in the United States would lead inexorably to national economic annihilation. A nuclear explosion in, say, New York City — as Obama so darkly invoked — would obviously be a tremendous calamity that would roil markets and cause great economic hardship, but would it extinguish the rest of the country? Would farmers cease plowing? Would manufacturers close their assembly lines? Would all businesses, governmental structures, and community groups evaporate?

Americans are highly unlikely to react to an atomic explosion, however disastrous, by immolating themselves and their economy. In 1945, Japan weathered not only two nuclear attacks but intense nationwide conventional bombing; the horrific experience did not destroy Japan as a society or even as an economy. Nor has persistent, albeit nonnuclear, terrorism in Israel caused that state to disappear — or to abandon democracy.

Even the notion that an act of nuclear terrorism would cause the American people to lose confidence in the government is belied by the traumatic experience of Sept. 11, 2001, when expressed confidence in America’s leaders paradoxically soared. And it contradicts decades of disaster research that documents how socially responsible behavior increases under such conditions — seen yet again in the response of those evacuating the World Trade Center on 9/11.

But what about the scenario of a nuclear explosion in one US city (e.g. New York) followed by the threat (!) of a terrorist organization to detonate nuclear explosives in two or three other cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, or Washington – or, even worse, two or three unspecified cities? I doubt that reactions of US citizens during and after the attacks of 9/11 are a good indicator for what would happen in situation like this. The discussion about whether terrorists could succeed in obtaining/constructing a nuclear weapons is of course a different story.

A last note: You may have heard that Libya’s Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi called for a Jihad against Switzerland …

It has been a long time …

Iran, Nuclear (Non)proliferation, Nuclear Terrorism, missile defense No Comments

since my last post here.

The reason for my lack of activity is … yes, the missile defense conference. To give you a brief up-date: we have expanded the program to include an additional panel on missile defense and missile non-proliferation.

You can download the detailed program here. To register for the conference (no fees) click here.

Apart from the conference, there are some other things I want to share with you:

Three papers …

and the thrill of waiting for the announced unveiling of new missiles and weapons by Iran:

A top commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said on Tuesday that the country’s armed forces will unveil several missiles and weapons at the 31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution next month.Mehr news agency quoted commander Massud Jazayeri as saying: “Several missile and weapons projects will be unveiled during the 10 days of dawn (February 1 to 11) by armed forces.” (AFP via Asian Defence, Janauary 26, 2010)

A New Blog: Counter-Terrorism.eu

Misc., Nuclear Terrorism No Comments

Franz Eder, the guy I have been sharing an office with since 1648 and with whom I have co-authored/edited some articles and books (the moste recent one being “Europe and Transnational Terrorism”) has recently entered the blogosphere.

So don’t miss his new blog on terrorism and counter-terrorism resarch @ http://www.counter-terrorism.eu !

America’s Most Dangerous Friend

Nuclear (Non)proliferation, Nuclear Terrorism No Comments

Largely drowned out by more spectacular proliferation news from Iran and North Korea, Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has acknowledged in Congressional testimony last month that it was known to him that Pakistan was expanding its nuclear arsenal (estimated at approximately 60 warheads in 2007) even as it was embroiled in heavy fighting with an ever-growing insurgency of radical Islamists some 60 miles from the capital, Islamabad. According to The New York Times, when asked by Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) whether he had any evidence that Pakistan was increasing the number of weapons at its disposal, Mullen gave a one-word answer: “Yes.” He did not elaborate.

Successive U.S. administrations have been plagued by acute worries about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arms. The revelation, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, that rogue nuclear scientists from Pakistan had met with Osama bin Laden and his second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, led many to embrace worst-case scenarios. Over the following years, the U.S. invested as much as $100 million in programs designed to keep the weapons safe. While the Pakistanis, jealously guarding their sovereignty, have never exposed how that money was actually used – both out of a sense of national pride and out of fear that the U.S. might try to seize or neutralize their arsenal in case they think a breakdown is imminent – their constant assurances and furious reactions to any indication of insufficient safety arrangements seem to have gone some way towards assuring U.S. policy-makers.  But the most recent achievements of the Taliban insurgents, apparently reversed by the Pakistani army in the offensive it launched last month, and the simultaneous confirmation by America’s most senior military officer of the intensification of Pakistan’s nuclear efforts have once again heightened fears that some of these weapons or critical knowledge about them might eventually fall into the wrong hands. While the Pakistani army’s self-declared victory in the Swat valley and the sheer multitude of foreign policy challenges facing the U.S. at this time seem to have displaced Pakistan from the top of the agenda for the moment, these fears are hardly unwarranted.

Writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists a few days after Mullen made his statement, Lawrence Korb, who had just returned from a trip to Pakistan, said that the media had overblown the dangers the insurgency poses to the country and its nuclear arsenal:

[T]he day we arrived, the U.S. media gave the impression that Pakistan was in dire straits. Some were going so far as to compare the current condition of Pakistan to that of contemporary Somalia, a failed state already in or about to be engulfed in chaos. Similarly, some high-level officials in the Obama administration contend Pakistan resembles Iran in 1979, a Muslim country about to be taken over by a group of radical Islamists. Others see Islamabad as Saigon in 1975, a capital city about to fall to an advancing enemy. Finally, some analysts compare today’s Pakistan to that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban stepped into a chaotic situation and restored order. After my trip, though, I believe that all of these comparisons are inaccurate and overstated. Pakistan isn’t about to descend into chaos, nor will it be taken over by the Taliban any time soon.

He goes on to write that the majority of Pakistanis does not support the insurgency and that the army is strong enough to keep the Taliban away from the country’s geographical and political center. “I am convinced,” he says, “that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons won’t be allowed to fall into the hands of the insurgents.” According to Mr Korb, America’s military and civilian leadership share this view, because “the weapons now are firmly under the control of the Pakistani Army; the army sees them as its main counterweight to India’s large conventional forces and nuclear capabilities, which it views as the real existential threat to Pakistan. That’s exactly why it’s currently increasing its nuclear arsenal.”

Mr Obama might trust the Pakistani military to protect its weapons, but I do not find these remarks very reassuring. In fact, I think it is profoundly disturbing that Pakistan’s army still thinks of India “as the real existential threat to Pakistan,” while their country is slowly but steadily rotting away from the inside. For one, this means that at least some of the nuclear weapons will continue to be stored where they are potentially most susceptible to seizure by non-state actors, far from the border with India and thus quite close to the Afghan border, because they might be overrun in case of a massive Indian offensive, which is next to unthinkable at this time.

Secondly, its fear of an Indian attack means that the army will probably continue to devote insufficient resources to its reluctant counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. (There are a number of other factors which also contribute to this.) Most of Pakistan’s high quality forces are stationed along the border with India and are likely to stay there. It is hard to say how well the 16,000 troops deployed in the recent offensive have fared against the Taliban, but one need not be a COIN expert to know that the aim must have been quite limited – to drive the Taliban back a few miles and silence Washington’s calls for more vigorous action – because otherwise, the scope of the operation would be grossly insufficient. Given the small proportion of forces implicated in the offensive (the Pakistani army numbers 550,000, paramilitary forces not included) and their poor performance in combat to this point (it is not clear whether this is due to a lack of will or a lack of capability) any progress that has been made over the past weeks is likely to be transitory. What is more, tens of thousands of soldiers have been deployed in the areas where the insurgency is most active for years and they have done little to contain it. Thus, even if the nuclear arsenal is safe in the short run, the Taliban will probably continue to strengthen in the long run, unless the army changes its approach quite radically.

The Pakistanis have most certainly taken multiple measures to protect their warheads from seizure. For example, the weapons are widely thought to be disassembled, with different parts stored in different locations. For all we know, they cannot be activated without proper authentication from at least two authorized individuals. It is not known, however, if these measures are adequate under the given circumstances. And even if adequate precautions are taken, blatant security breaches can never be ruled out – remember the 2007 USAF nuclear weapons incident, when 6 nuclear warheads were mistakenly attached to an unguarded B-52 and remained unaccounted for for a period of 36 hours. Given that the Taliban and al-Qaeda will probably spare no effort to get hold of a nuclear weapon, a scenario in which one or more warheads are seized by extremists or passed on to them by rogue elements within Pakistan’s defense establishment is hardly implausible, even if these forces should never manage to take over Pakistan.

Combine a thriving insurgency of religious extremists with a marked increase in the number of nuclear weapons, indirectly paid for by U.S. aid (which frees up vast amounts of resources) and potentially available for seizure, add in rampant corruption on all levels of Pakistan’s political and defense establishment, and you have a recipe  for insomnia in Washington. Somewhat counter-intuitively, it is not always an enemy that constitutes the gravest threat to a great power’s security interests. While much more has been said and written about the dangers emanating from the nuclear program of Iran, a long-standing enemy of the United States, it might actually be the nuclear program of Pakistan, which has been considered a friend for the better part of a decade, that constitutes the more serious threat to American interests in the region and beyond. It is there that the Bush administration’s assertion, in the now discredited 2002 National Security Strategy, that “[t]he gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology” might prove true, after all.

Of Terrorists and Rogues …

Nuclear Terrorism, Rogue State, publications No Comments

No, not what you might think! Not “axis of evil … arming to threaten the peace of the world”. Not this time ;-)

Franz sent me this paper by Malici and Buckner in the latest issue of the Journal for Peace Studies. Here is the abstract:

The conventional wisdom regarding Iran and Syria is that these are belligerent states headed by hostile leaders. Rarely is an effort made to imagine how international politics are perceived from the Iranian or the Syrian perspectives, or consider how these perceptions are part of an interactive crisis in which the USA may be implicated as deeply as the regimes in Tehran and Damascus. In this article, we investigate the United States’ ongoing crisis with Iran and Syria from the vantage point of their leadership. Our central research questions are: What kind of leaders are Ahmadinejad of Iran and al-Asad of Syria? More specifically, what are their cognitive diagnostic beliefs of the ensuing conflict and their prescriptive beliefs towards it? What is an appropriate strategy for the USA towards Iran and Syria? The answers to these questions speak to the conventional wisdom of Ahmadinejad and al-Asad as hostile and propose strategies for averting a dangerous escalation of the conflict. Our central goal in this article is to develop towards Iran and Syria ‘realistic empathy’ as we consider it ‘the great corrective for all forms of warprovoking misperception’.

Malici, Akan, and Allison L. Buckner. 2008. ‘Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad.’ Journal of Peace Research 45 (6): 783.

Yes, a corretive for warprovoking misperception is really needed (as I argued in my paper on the perception of Iran as rogue state – click here to read it).

As for the terrorists: Brian Michael Jenkins of RAND recently published the monograph Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?. He briefly summarizes his main argument on the RAND website.

Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism

Deterrence, Nuclear Terrorism No Comments

Ein neuer Report des CFR von Michael A. Levi. (pdf download)