Greg Mello has an op-ed on the web-page of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in which he argues that the increase of funding for nuclear weapons in the federal budget request contradicts President Obama’s stated goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Now here is my take on a second Obama disarmament paradox:

Reading through the DoD’s BMD Review Report the other day, two things caught my eye:

First: In the section on co-operation with the Russian Federation, the report states that “the Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defense.” (p. 34) This sounds like there will be rough times ahead for further offensive reductions as Russian political and military elites have repeatedly linked further reductions to an agreement on missile defense (if you have the common “Russia has to disarm anyway”-argument in mind, you should drop by Pavel Podvig’s blog and let yourself convince of the contrary)

Second, and even more interesting: The report also notes that the US needs to put an emphasis on the development and deployment of

missile defenses that are both relocatable and scalable. Relocatable assets can be surged to a region in times of crisis, providing increased capability against a larger threat raid size. This feature will also allow missile defenses to be brought to bear in regions relatively swiftly. Scalable assets can be integrated into existing regional architectures. (p. 27)

In addition, the DoD intends “to develop an ‘engage on remote’ technology that includes not only launching on data from a remote sensor track but also the ability to uplink data from assets other than the Aegis radar. This will allow the interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater ranges.” (p. 22) An illustration on the same page shows a forward-based X-band radar and a space-based sensor providing information to an Aegis ship.

Alright, now here is a brief passage of Dean Wilkening’s 2000 Adelphi Paper “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability”:

Only when upper-tier interceptors are guided in flight beyond the range of their tracking and fire control radars can THAAD or NTW [Navy Theater Wide] provide substantial coverage of the US. For example, if accurate track data is obtained early in the trajectory of an intercontinental missile by sensors such as upgraded early-warning radars located outside the US or SBIRS-Low, and this track data is communicated to interceptors in flight, then the hypothetical THAAD footprint against ICBMs increases to a circle about 1,100km in diameter. This implies that 10-12 sites could cover the continental United States. Between three and four NTW footprints would be required under these circumstances. Currently, neither THAAD nor NTW is being designed to accept track data in flight except from their ground- or sea-based radars. However, if SBIRS-Low is deployed, Russian planners fearing the worst might believe that upper-tier TMD interceptors could be guided in flight using its track data, especially if the in-flight interceptor communications system is deployed as part of a future US NMD system. [emphasis added]

On balance, it is hard to imagine that Russia or China would be willing to considerably reduce their offensive arsenals, if the US retains the ability to boost the homeland defense by relocating and/or connecting TMD systems with remote sensors.

Oh yes, I’m really looking forward to discussing these issues at next week’s conference. Anyway, I would also appreciate earlier – online – comments on missile defense break-out and global zero

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